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ABSTRACT
This paper comprises original research on China’s use of 
bilateral media cooperation to mediate its Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Building upon the literature on strategic nar-
ratives, aesthetic power and the Silk Road as a foreign policy 
concept, we present a detailed case study of the visual 
imagery of the “Silk Road” documentary collaboration 
between China’s and Russia’s state-owned international 
broadcasters, China Radio International and RT (formerly 
Russia Today). We employ a visual methodology to interro-
gate the formation and projection of multimodal (visual, 
textual and oral) narratives about China’s infrastructural 
activities along this metaphorical new “Silk Road”. We exam-
ine how the Silk Road series gives sense to China’s BRI, the 
relative weighting of Chinese and Russian strategic narratives 
about the BRI, and how power is distributed in this Chinese- 
Russian media partnership. Our analysis reveals that in re- 
packaging visual imagery that applies nostalgia to the history 
of core places and technologizes their future, the series 
projects a pre-curated Chinese visual narrative that emplots 
the BRI as human and cultural development. Russian regional 
strategic narratives are marginalized. China is applying its 
aesthetic power to Russian journalists and politicians; RT 
obtains some commercial benefits, but the Russian state’s 
aesthetic power is ceded to China.
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Introduction
Visual images have significant potential to frame relationships and debates in 
global politics because they can rapidly convey symbolic information to casual 
audiences, engaged journalists, and wider elites. They are also easier than text- 
based information to share transnationally among diverse audiences with var-
ied cultural and educational starting points. Such images can not only shape 
how people think about and respond to particular global developments (Shim 
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2013, 23), but in influencing wider political relationships and debates, they also 
frame the policy possibilities deemed appropriate (Bleiker 2015, 874). It is there-
fore unsurprising that in an age of almost ubiquitous internet use, governments 
across the globe increasingly pursue strategies that allow them to visually 
communicate internationally online.
The economically well-established Western liberal democracies have been 
engaged in international television broadcasting initiatives since at least the 
nineties, often building on successful radio operations.1 However, the past two 
decades have seen the establishment of various new broadcasting outlets 
sponsored by less economically established or “rising” powers, often with an 
explicit counter-hegemonic remit.2 Online and social media, rather than tradi-
tional broadcasting, provide the centerpiece of these networks' dissemination 
strategies (Eisa et al. 2017), enabling them to maximize their potential global 
reach, on a free-to-access basis.
Within this context, this paper presents original research on how China uses 
international broadcasting collaborations to produce and project visual strate-
gic narratives supporting key policy priorities that their target audiences are 
supposed to relate to. After providing a general overview of China’s interna-
tional broadcasting collaborations across various regions, we provide an in- 
depth empirical case study of how such collaboration has been applied to 
what is arguably China’s most significant foreign policy initiative in modern 
times – the multinational infrastructural and economic cooperation project 
known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Initially launched as a plan to 
construct a Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, it 
can be seen as the “‘umbrella project’ for China’s new economic statecraft, 
within which almost all other major international policies are supposed to be 
framed” (Xin 2016). This umbrella draws together initiatives across 70 countries 
across Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas, and is broadly organized around 
six “growth corridors”. More than that, it also represents a “‘going out’ strategy 
in which not only money and goods, but also ideas start to travel on a transna-
tional level” (Pieper 2018, 218), allowing China to present a preferred vision of 
itself and its policies to the world.
Initial regional frictions over the BRI surrounded its potential overlap with the 
Russian-sponsored integrative initiative, the Eurasian Union (EAEU). While this 
was notionally solved with a 2015 joint declaration of coordination between the 
two institutions (Xin 2016), it has been mitigated in reality by the EAEU’s internal 
issues and declining geopolitical relevance. Subsequent sources of resistance to 
the BRI have come from within target states, which demonstrate mixed under-
standings and low levels of trust toward the project (Reed and Hille 2019; 
Stanway 2019; Garcia-Herrera and Jianwei 2019; Matura 2018; van Noort and 
Colley 2021). The Chinese authorities have taken such skepticism seriously and 
have actively attempted to bring public opinion around (Rolland 2019). This has 
included putting to use resources built up as part of a sustained program to 
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advance China’s international communication power since 2009 (De Bao 2016). 
These “going out” media plans boosted the international presence of China’s 
“Big Four”, comprising CGTN (formerly CCTV), China Radio International, Xinhua 
News Agency and the China Daily newspaper (Shambaugh 2010). As President 
Xi Jinping argued in 2014: “We should increase China’s soft power, give a good 
Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014).
Soft power can be taken in its simplest form as the power of attraction (Nye 
2004), and the Chinese Communist Party and the government together oversee 
China’s media engagements and soft power strategies (Edney 2012). Soft power 
is “inherently relational” in its contingency on audience reception (Feklyunina 
2016, 775), and China’s approach to foreign policy under Xi has therefore 
emphasized the value of ideas of reform and revolution, as well as Chinese 
civilization, Chinese morality (Confucian values) and “artistic charm” – per-
formed through calligraphy and poetry (Callahan 2016; Lee 2016). 
Consistently reiterating the interrelationship between new ideas, institutions, 
policies and projects (Callahan 2016; Zhou and Esteban 2018) Xi’s leadership has 
mobilized the “charm” and attractiveness of China’s civilization and cultural 
inheritance to help promote the “China Dream” – the values-informed devel-
opment of Chinese society and economy – that is seen as lying at the heart of 
both Chinese unity at home, and its contribution to peace and development 
internationally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 
2014).
Such ideas have featured prominently in China’s official discourse around the 
BRI, in which narratives of the 5000-year civilizational history of China and the 
2000-year history of the Silk Road have reinforced a depoliticized, historic, 
cultural legacy seen as shaping China’s modern identity (van Noort 2022). 
Since 2015, the cultural component of this narrative formation has been 
reflected in the Chinese state’s more active international public relations related 
to the BRI. A few studies have discussed the potential role of corporate public 
diplomacy as BRI promotion (Yang 2018) the employment of high-level eco-
nomic diplomacy (Wang 2016), or cultural exchange and promotion at the 
institutional or individual level (Dave 2018; Nursha 2018; Song and Qiqi 2018; 
Sterling 2018; Winter 2019). Other studies, which vary significantly in their levels 
of detail, have examined how the BRI is represented internationally in various 
countries’ print media, whether by domestic or Chinese outlets, or via compar-
isons of the two (Lin 2019; Zhang and Doreen 2017; He and Liu 2019; Xiao, Yue, 
and Jie 2019). Other studies assess how foreign states appropriate China’s 
strategic narratives in their official government communications (van Noort 
and Colley 2021; van Noort, 2021a). Most recently, an increasing body of work 
has begun to recognize the importance of the visual component of China’s 
strategic communication around the BRI, with studies emerging on maps/ 
geographical imaginaries (Mayer 2018; Narins and Agnew 2019), on direct 
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outputs of digital visual communication (van Noort 2020a, 2021b), and on the 
“Silk Road” cultural imaginary (van Noort 2022). However, the ways in which 
these narratives are remediated for the wider audiences of international media 
outlets remain understudied, as do the ways in which target audiences copro-
duce meanings through their own interpretations. This is despite the fact that 
China has actively pursued international multimedia collaborations in recent 
years, and while these have often been characterized by a lack of transparency 
(Qing and Shifman 2015), the associated expenditure appears substantial 
(Farivar 2021). Despite having yet received no scholarly attention, these colla-
borations represent an important strand in the promotion strategy of the BRI 
and the “Chinese Dream” that underpins it.
After providing a general overview of China’s international media collabora-
tions, this paper provides in-depth empirical analysis of a particularly salient one 
of these international multimedia collaborations – a five episode “Silk Road” 
documentary series produced through collaboration between the Chinese and 
Russian international broadcasters, China Radio International (CRI) and RT (for-
merly Russia Today) (Russia Today 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e). The 
paper also interrogates how the series’ meaning is coproduced by the partici-
pants that made up its immediate – elite – audience. Neither Russia nor China 
can control the wider meaning or reception of the images among international 
media audiences, so an audience-focused study would be valuable to ascertain 
whether and why target audiences accept or reject the narratives of the Silk 
Road Series, to further illuminate the social and political significance of this 
international media collaboration. While a worthy object for future study, 
audience analysis remains beyond the remit of the present paper.
On one hand, the Silk Road series exemplifies China’s pursuit of cultural soft 
power in the domestic and international political contexts, with the push of 
Chinese civilization and Silk Road narratives. Yet it also conforms to principles of 
Chinese foreign policy that have a significant historic pedigree. The first is Mao 
Zedong’s strategy of “making the foreign serve China” (famous example: Snow 
1937), which posits that by inviting foreign journalists to experience a curated 
visit of the country, their reports will be more credible and positive. The second, 
more recent, strategy of “borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean” (Brady 2015; 
Lim and Bergin 2018) describes the process of disseminating government- 
approved content in foreign media to enhance the legitimacy of the narratives. 
China pursues the two strategies simultaneously with the international multi-
media collaboration of CRI and RT.
While the Russian side’s role in the collaboration builds on longstanding 
Soviet practices of communicating with foreign audiences (Yablokov and 
Chatterje-Doody 2022, 22–3), for China, it reflects an increased openness to 
international media collaboration since the 1990s (Yecies, Keane, and Flew 
2016). This has supported an active promotion of China’s image that has closely 
tracked the country’s economic resurgence (Breslin 2011, 5–7). The disparities in 
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the two state sponsors’ international media experience, economic and political 
weight, raise interesting questions about how this influences the collaborative 
process, content and strategic outcomes of the documentary.
Given that both CRI and RT are intended to represent their sponsor states’ 
perspectives to the world, our analysis of the CRI-RT co-created visual product 
provides important new insights into the fulfillment of cooperative soft power 
messaging. The following analysis interrogates the relative weighting of 
Chinese and Russian strategic narratives about the BRI; the ways in which the 
Silk Road series gives sense to China’s BRI; and the extent to which this Chinese- 
Russian media partnership brings strategic benefits for the different states, 
broadcasters and journalists involved. In addition to the empirical contribution, 
this paper adds a theoretical contribution to the study of visual politics, strategic 
narratives, aesthetic power, and the Silk Road as a foreign policy discourse by 
explaining how the collaborative process and visual content of documentaries 
are strategized in political communication.
Theoretical framework
Strategic narratives and aesthetic power
International relations are increasingly influenced by the practice of strategic 
communication. Following the narrative turn in IR studies, “strategic narratives” 
are theorized as a “means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of 
the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of 
domestic and international actors” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 
2). Strategic narratives contribute to short- and long-term goals, including “[a] 
genda setting, legitimation, diverting attention, securing acquiescence, enhan-
cing popularity, and mobilization” (ibid, 8). This is possible because narratives 
create expectations and guide meaning-making by explaining the “who, what, 
when, where and why” (Burke 1962). The communication process of strategic 
narratives involves the formation of content, the projection of mixed media and 
audience reception (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Mitchell 2005). 
This is a complex and uncertain process because the international environment 
is “filled with multiple narratives – competing and overlapping, epochal and 
issue-specific” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 102).
Strategic narrative scholarship mainly investigates verbal and written com-
munication. This paper contributes to the emerging debate about visuality and 
strategic narratives (Chatterje-Doody and Crilley 2019; Crilley 2015; O’Loughlin 
et al. 2011; Swimelar 2018; van Noort 2017, 2020b), which has developed in 
response to the unprecedented spread of visual communication in the digital 
age. There are four key attributes enabling images to convey strategic narratives 
effectively: they can visualize cause and effect; “make important claims about 
power”; authenticate what an actor claims; and elicit an emotional response in 
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audiences (Swimelar 2018, 182). In fact, images of strategically important topics 
derive their power precisely from how far audiences feel emotional or “affective 
investment” in the identities portrayed on screen, which enable them to identify 
with one account over another (Chatterje-Doody and Crilley 2019; Crilley and 
Chatterje-Doody 2020; Solomon 2014). So, while visuals are deployed to support 
the communication of strategic narratives, they can also complicate and under-
mine strategic narratives. This may be due to internal visual inconsistencies, 
visual-verbal contradictions, and the inability of political actors to control the 
meaning or reception of the image in the new media ecology (Swimelar 2018; 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013).
Aesthetic power
For effective visual communication of particular strategic narratives, the aes-
thetic power of the images used is crucial. Aesthetic power operates in the same 
way as cosmetic makeup; to empower, to beautify or to improve a self-identity. 
As such, it constitutes an important component of any soft power strategy 
(Solomon 2014). So, as political actors attempt to create a desirable Self in 
international relations, they “utilize resources to apply a cosmetic image to 
the operations of power” (Steele 2010, 25, 2008). These aesthetic constructions 
are intended to create “a more secure environment for a community or Self (a 
‘show of force’ or ‘demonstration of will’)” (Steele 2010, 27). In the case under 
study, the aesthetic construction relates to China’s self-concept and foreign 
policies. The resources utilized for this purpose are the financial and human 
investments in the Chinese-Russian state-owned international media collabora-
tion around the BRI. Since aesthetic power is shaped over generations and via 
technological developments (Steele 2010, 62), it undergoes a continuous pro-
cess of development.
Steele considers the psychological, imaginative and rhythmic strata of aes-
thetic power, of which the rhythmic stratum is of specific importance to this 
paper. In this conceptualization, power is projected “through the routines 
agents perform that attend to their senses of Self” (Steele 2010, 36). This 
might involve displays of the mundane (e.g. commuting), or equally, extraor-
dinary events, in the case of spectacles (e.g. air shows in Steele 2010). In this 
paper, we consider routine processes both in the production of content (what is 
shown) and in the dissemination process (how, when and where content is 
shown), outlining how this rhythmic content and repetitive act cultivate aes-
thetic power. Our analysis of the Silk Road series demonstrates how routines of 
the mundane, through a melody of cranes, construction sites, residential build-
ings and human faces, generate aesthetic power in the present. In parallel, 
visuals of cultural heritage sites and tourist experiences contribute to extra-
ordinary imaginaries of the past, while inferring continuity and also progression.
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Steele explains that aesthetic power “becomes vulnerable when its aesthetic 
vision becomes over-pristine” (Steele 2010, 41). In other words, the power of 
strategic narratives is disrupted when the visuals look “too good to be true”. In 
masking social realities, aesthetic power is therefore potentially vulnerable 
when confronted with counternarratives. Yet, counternarratives naturally arise 
to fill the “gap that inevitably opens up between a form of representation and 
the object it seeks to represent” (Bleiker 2001, 512). So, our analysis will show 
how the visuals of the Silk Road series associate infrastructure projects with 
dreams of prosperity and hope, while political conflict and unrest in the Chinese 
province of Xinjiang – the site of many important Silk Road oasis towns – are 
visually ignored. This, then, exemplifies Chinese agency in manipulating their 
aesthetic image to ensure, as Xi envisioned, that the Chinese people (and 
foreign audiences indirectly) have “a correct concept of history, national view-
point, state outlook and cultural perspective” (Xi 2014).
Silk road as a foreign policy discourse
Since aesthetic power is used to create an attractive self in international rela-
tions, it is open to historical statecraft – meaning “the systematic application of 
representations of the past (real or imagined) in order to frame and legitimize 
foreign policy, naturalize a certain image or role of a country, and stabilize 
collective identities on national, regional and global levels (‘communalization’)” 
(Mayer 2018, 1222). Communicating narratives about the Silk Road is a form of 
historical statecraft. Not only China but also Japan, South Korea, India, and the 
US have used the history of the Silk Road in their foreign policy discourse – 
predominantly in their Central Asia policy (Dadabaev 2018a, 2018b; Laruelle 
2015). The “Silk Road” terminology coined by German geographer Ferdinand 
von Richhofen in the late nineteenth century (Richthofen 1877) is deployed in 
foreign policy discourses in the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries due to its 
association with “regional trade networks, cultures of diplomacy, and the har-
monious relations that come from the free movement of ideas, people, tech-
nologies, and goods” (Winter 2019, 10). There is no authentic Silk Road; instead, 
people are faced with the “invented and the reinvented” Silk Road (Chin 2013, 
194). As our analysis of the Silk Road series shows, selective representations of 
the Silk Road history boost China’s aesthetic power.
The Silk Road as a foreign policy discourse can support political objectives 
such as agenda setting and legitimation. In this case, the Chinese authorities 
seek to discipline China-centric Silk Road narratives that support their identity- 
narrative as a “good neighbor, good friend, and good partner” (van Noort 2022), 
and their order-narrative of inclusive globalization. China’s Silk Road narratives 
evoke nostalgia for the past (van Noort 2022; Benabdallah 2021; Thorsten 2005; 
Fasslabend 2015). Specifically, China’s communication romanticizes famous 
travelers of the Silk Road (van Noort 2022), presents a geographical imagination 
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of the Silk Road that places China at the center of regional and continental 
connectivity (Winter 2020), and celebrates the exchange of goods, ideas, and 
knowledge along the Silk Road (for more details, see Hansen 2012; Frankopan 
2015). At the same time, China smooths over historical episodes of the Silk Road 
that would undermine this aesthetically appealing representation of the past 
(for instance, treasure hunters along the Silk Road in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, see Hopkirk 1980). Thus, states can discursively use 
the Silk Road in their communication to contrive a positive image of the past as 
well as themselves.
There is soft power in history and heritage, because “they provide the 
symbolic and discursive framing around which relationships are woven 
together” (Winter 2019, 132). The Silk Road as a foreign policy discourse is not 
only useful to China in dealing with modern Eurasia (Frankopan 2015), it has 
narrative currency beyond its “original” geography. With Xi Jinping referring to a 
Silk Road “spirit” (Xinhua 2017) which assumedly can be restored and rejuve-
nated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2019), the 
positive values and qualities associated with the Silk Road history are broadly 
applicable. Now, any country can potentially co-opt China’s Silk Road narratives 
while it legitimizes its policy choice to join the BRI (van Noort and Colley 2021). 
Moreover, the association of the BRI with the revived Silk Road softens China’s 
infrastructural activities and ambition to become a global technological power 
that have perpetuated both hope and fear (see “Made in China 2025 strategy”, 
Zenglein and Holzmann 2019). As the case study analysis will show, the Silk 
Road discourse is visually deployed to give meaning to China’s behaviors in the 
past, present and the future.
Overall, visual politics is an intricate process of masking, beautifying, and 
reiterating, intended to advance a country’s aesthetic power.
Case study and approach
In this article, we present a rigorous analysis of the production, content and 
dissemination of a five-part documentary series produced collaboratively by the 
state-owned international broadcasters, RT and China Radio International (CRI), 
in 2017.3 Documentaries aim to capture reality and inform the public, using fact- 
finding journalism. Nonetheless, documenting reality is a subjective practice, 
shaped by an organization’s norms, values, ideas and interests, which – explicitly 
or implicitly – inform the work’s content, format and manner of dissemination. 
The collaboration of these two state broadcasters on the series indicates that its 
visual narratives of the Silk Road are broadly compatible with one or both states’ 
strategic objectives toward international audiences, but reveals little about the 
immediate concerns of journalists involved, nor the series’ production 
dynamics. To interrogate the formation and projection of multimodal (visual, 
textual and oral) narratives about China’s infrastructural activities along this 
8 C. VAN NOORT AND P. N. CHATTERJE-DOODY
metaphorical new “Silk Road”, we apply a critical visual methodology focusing 
on “constitutive questions of meaning construction, production and perfor-
mance” (Kirkpatrick 2015, 205; see also Bleiker 2018; Gillespie and Toynbee 
2006; Hansen 2006).
Building on the work of Gillian Rose (2016) and Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and 
Roselle (2013), we suggest that there are three broad strands of relevance when 
analyzing these visual images: their formation; projection; and reception. 
“Formation” combines both the background to the production of an image 
(including strategic objectives behind it), with the social aspects surrounding its 
production, for instance, “the range of economic, social and political relations, 
institutions and practices” relevant to the image’s formation (Rose 2016, 26). The 
following section of the paper therefore opens with a discussion of the circum-
stances of the Silk Road series’ formation.
“Projection” refers to the nature of the image itself, and the methods for its 
circulation. This includes an image’s technological and compositional attributes 
– “specific material qualities”, such as “content, colour and spatial organization” 
(Rose 2016, 25), as well as its formatting and fit with specific circulation/dis-
semination technologies and platforms. We adopt a rigorous multi-modal man-
ual approach in order to simultaneously address two forms of visual information 
(written text; still and moving images) and two forms of audio accompaniment 
(audio commentary; audio soundtracks) projecting strategic narratives of the 
BRI. We pay particular attention (after Hansen 2006, 73–83) to three key aspects 
of the Silk Road series’ representations: temporal moment/s; subject/s of dis-
course; and event/s. Automated sentiment analysis techniques are not suited to 
assessing such an intricate combination of attributes (Poria et al. 2017, 874), 
making manual analysis critical for uncovering the chains of implied causes, 
consequences and agency contained within a strategic narrative that may be 
split across different parts of the videos or the series as a whole (Chatterje- 
Doody and Crilley 2019), as well as the ways in which these factors supposedly 
entail implications for future policymaking.
Together, this package of analytical techniques enables us to interrogate 
rigorously the ways in which this Chinese-Russian media collaboration pro-
jected the “facts” about the (New) Silk Road: the representation of significant 
moments in the Silk Road story; the subjects around which the story centered; 
the events portrayed as meaningful in the ways in which the story played out; 
and the likely future implications. An interrogation of the precise audiences 
consuming this series, as well as of their “reception” or interpretive co-produc-
tion of the meaning of these visual images, merits further study in order to 
ascertain the success of such projection strategies. It is, however, beyond the 
remit of this particular paper.
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Our final concern is to ascertain the strategic value of this Chinese-Russian 
media partnership to the states, broadcasters and journalists involved. We 
address this question by situating our analysis of the series itself alongside an 
interrogation of the political circumstances of its production, to which we now 
turn.
Formation and projection of visual narratives of the silk road
A country like China could never be summarized in a series of 30-minute films or in any 
number of books. Travelers have to see China with their own eyes to properly 
experience and appreciate this unique land. There is no other way to truly know and 
love this mystery of the country. But perhaps this brief introduction may inspire others 
to explore it for themselves. (Ep. 5, min. 25-26)
Formation: media strategy and the BRI
The conditions of the formation of the Silk Road series are complex. As pre-
viously noted, the BRI concept had become the guiding principle for organizing 
Chinese economic strategy, yet buy-in to the many of the project’s initiatives by 
publics and media in target states has been mixed (van Noort 2021; Reed and 
Hille 2019; Stanway 2019; Garcia-Herrera and Jianwei 2019; Matura 2018). The 
production of the “Silk Road” documentary series was informed by these 
strategic concerns, in the context of longstanding Russian (formerly Soviet) 
media support for foreign policy activities, paired with the dramatic recent 
rise in Chinese online and broadcast initiatives intended to engage and build 
connections with overseas publics.
Perhaps the most overtly promotional of these contemporary co-productions 
is the “Hello China” program, a collaboration between China Radio International 
and a Chinese-founded international media and trade facilitation company, GB 
Times, beginning in 2011. This commenced with the production of a series of 
online shorts intended to introduce Chinese language and culture to interna-
tional audiences.4 The vast number of video shorts released in sequential 
fashion contributed to the rhythmic aesthetic power of the “Hello China” 
program, which has been further bolstered with the expansion of the initiative 
over multiple cycles. These cycles have seen the production of various multi-
media outputs including a book, DVD and online cultural resources about China, 
launched in languages including Bulgarian (Xinhua 2015) as well as English. 
China’s approach to outward-facing media resources had therefore taken on a 
well-established rhythm before attention turned directly to the promotion of 
the BRI.
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With this as the general context, it is significant that the announcement of 
strategic coordination between China’s BRI and the Russian-sponsored EAEU, in 
2015, coincided with the year of the inaugural China–Russia media forum. 
Subsequently repeated as an annual event, and followed with the officially 
designated Year of Russia–China Media Communication of 2016–17 (which 
coincided with the fourth cycle of “Hello China”), this period witnessed 
increased media cooperation between China and Russia. Such cooperation 
was supported at the highest levels, as demonstrated by the 2017 agreement 
between Presidents Putin and Xi on the establishment of a Russian-language 
(Chinese subtitled) channel produced in collaboration by Russia’s state-owned 
Channel 1 and CCTV, and broadcast via satellite in China.5
The coincidence of the inaugural media forum with the announcement of 
institutional BRI-EAEU strategic coordination provided a logical opening for 
media collaboration around these integrative projects, and Russia’s then 
Deputy Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications, Alexey Volin, vocally 
advocated for Russian-Chinese media cooperation in order to promote the 
integration of BRI and EAEU (McIntyre 2015). In the end, a collaborative media 
forum and associated promotional trip was organized, enabling Russian journal-
ists to travel the route of the new Silk Road. A resounding success as far as 
volume of outputs is concerned, this initiative of “20 days and 4000 km inspired 
more than 200 articles, essays, news stories, and even a documentary series” (ep. 
5, min. 26.30). This documentary series not only emblematized Sino-Russian 
media collaboration at this crucial juncture but also precipitated an agreement 
on substantially increased Russian-Chinese media collaboration the following 
year (RIA Novosti 2018), intended to allow the two sides to “tell each other’s 
stories well” (Drinhausen and Solonina 2020). It is precisely this highly significant 
documentary series – the Silk Road Series – that provides the original empirical 
material for our investigation.
This five-episode series was released in 2017, and includes episodes dedi-
cated to various elements of the new Silk Road, including its infrastructure, 
language and economy. The closing credits to each episode give special thanks 
to the respective Embassies of Russia and China in each other’s country, and to 
both countries’ departments of state with responsibility for the mass media. This 
indicates both states’ formal buy-in to the documentary collaboration at the 
highest levels. Yet, there are some interesting asymmetries apparent in the two 
sides’ involvement in the practical formation of the series. These asymmetries 
reveal China’s communication strategies of “making the foreign serve China” 
and “borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean” in action.
At first glance, the Silk Road documentary series appears as an RT production. 
Its narrator is RTD’s (RT Documentary channel) regular voice actor, several of the 
writers and production staff have worked on other programs and series’ 
released by RT and its parent company, TV-Novosti,6 and it was disseminated 
under the RTD logo on the Russian network’s web- and YouTube channels. 
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However, several of the featured journalists – including the main presenter, 
Russian journalist, Anna Allabert – work for CRI, and the title sequences for each 
video in the Silk Road series prominently display the “Hello China” logo. The 
narrative of the series’ production given in the finished product is of a colla-
boratively organized initiative bringing together Russian and Chinese journalists 
to experience for themselves the developments along the new Silk Road. Yet, 
the copyright for the series rests solely with China Radio International (CRI).
While there is no public information about the financial framework of this co- 
production, or China’s international broadcasting operation as a whole, the 
latest FARA filings for TV operations in the USA (with China in first place) indicate 
that China’s budget for international media collaborations likely exceeds 
Russia’s (Farivar 2021). That being the case, the project looks as much like a 
Chinese commission as a genuine collaboration.
What is more, despite the long form of these documentaries, they make clear 
visual and stylistic references to the original “Hello China” shorts released back 
in 2011/12, that reflect the political leadership’s vision of China’s artistic charm. 
These include opening sequences that pair traditional Chinese music with the 
gradual appearance of calligraphy. Such similarities notwithstanding, the indi-
vidual episodes of the series have their own stylistic particularities. These 
include imagery weighted toward particular symbols (industry, speed and 
scale in the infrastructure and economy episodes; folk and traditionalized 
culture images in the episodes dedicated to language, tourism and history) as 
well as individualized color palettes per episode. Yet, despite these particula-
rities, there are some striking themes that recur across the series, in which a clear 
strategic narrative of the Silk Road project, and its positive impact on target 
communities, is projected through visual imagery.
The following section of the paper interrogates the projection in further 
detail. Nonetheless, it is worth noting at this early stage that the visual char-
acteristics of the Silk Road series correspond to China’s approach to cultural soft 
power, which predates the introduction of the BRI, while the specific strategic 
narratives projected in the Silk Road series bear clear resemblance to earlier 
Chinese formal messaging around the BRI. Indeed, the finished product takes on 
the characteristics of an advertorial commissioned for the Chinese state, out-
sourced for strategic reasons to a Russian crew who as foreigners “serve China”.
Projection: strategic narratives of the past, present and future
Past
Aesthetic power is used to beautify and discipline strategic narratives of the 
past. The documentary series celebrates specific periods of Silk Road develop-
ment (related to the Han and Tang Dynasties, which have also been celebrated 
in social media productions by CGTN and Xinhua News Agency, see van Noort 
2022). The programs apply nostalgia to the history of the Silk Road, and they 
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romanticize Chinese culture and artistic charm. With the aid of aerial shots and 
close up caravan shots, the series reimagines the transportation of goods from 
the East to the West in ancient times (ep. 1, min. 4; ep. 5, min. 20.29). The 
visualization of the challenging conditions of camel transport across the barren 
dessert – with regards the excessive exposure to the sunlight and saddle 
discomfort – support the historical re-imagination (ep. 3, min. 1.56). The move-
ment of people and trade to and from China are visually represented with 
camels on maps (ep. 3, min. 13.19) and information chyrons are superimposed 
with camels walking in caravan (ep. 1, min. 3.46). There are several references to 
the travels of Marco Polo – one of the most known Silk Road travelers; when a 
Russian journalist is riding a camel, and when visiting the Mogao caves in 
Dunhuang, China (ep. 1, min. 4; ep. 5, min. 17.45). The Chinese cities of 
Urumqi, Khasgar and Xi’an are visually mapped and linked with a red line to 
Almaty, Khiva, Bukhara, Teheran, Baghdad and Damascus (ep. 4, min. 13.08). 
Images of camels, desserts and heritage cities, as well as reference to the Travels 
of Marco Polo characterize the Silk Road past; its history is beautified and 
disciplined.
The visuals demonstrate the association of China’s self-identity with civiliza-
tion and Silk Road narratives. The opening imagery of each of the episodes 
emphasizes the uniqueness of traditional Chinese culture; people are practicing 
Tai Chi/Chi Gung, paper fans are opening and closing, and there are long shots 
of traditional Chinese architecture (e.g. ep. 5). Visuals of the historic Silk Road 
juxtapose this timeless presentation of China. The Chinese city of Xi’an – the 
capital city of the Han and Tang Dynasties – is presented as the starting point of 
the Silk Road (ep. 1, min. 7.02), and characterized as the cradle of Chinese 
civilization (ep. 5, min. 6.46). Aerial shots of the city walls of Xi’an symbolize 
civilization and safety. The gate of Yangguan is another city that prospered 
during the historic Silk Road, due to its place as “China’s first ever customs 
house” (ep. 1, min. 21.39). The Yangguan gate also symbolizes civilization by 
visually dividing “safe” China with the dangerous “beyond”. Together, these 
visuals positively report on China as a continuous civilization and a positive 
force for trade.
The Silk Road series supports the view that this ancient trading route can still 
be experienced. In addition to camel riding, China’s “[m]any invaluable world 
contributions still draw tourists” (ep. 3, min. 1.07). These contributions refer to 
the Chinese invention of paper, the compass and gunpowder. The videos 
celebrate Chinese culture (e.g. visual imagery of costumed Chinese opera sing-
ers in ep. 3, min. 3.01). Moreover, journalistic testimonials about the art of tea 
and acupuncture are used to legitimize the view that China is “worth coming to” 
(episode 3, min. 16.56 and 19.35). Before, it was merchants who experienced the 
ancient Silk Road, but “today it is tourists who blaze trails between exotic 
destinations” (ep. 3, min. 3.20). In reporting a visit to the Terracotta warriors, 
the Russian CRI presenter, Allabert, makes clear that this experience is 
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something that dreams are made of: “I’ve long dreamed of coming here and 
now here I am” (ep. 3, min. 5.54). Positive experiences of the ancient Silk Road 
make Russian journalists wish that they could stay longer in China (ep. 5, min. 
16.28), and they promote the Silk Road tourism experience for a wider audience, 
since “every foreign visitor will cherish their own personal China” (ep. 5, min. 
1.18). Therefore, the series suggest that a China-centric Silk Road can still be 
experienced today.
The series selectively represents history by positioning China, with the aid of 
maps, at the heart of a peaceful Silk Road (ep. 3, min. 13.19). One of the episodes 
explains that it is Chinese custom to write up their own history, and this is “why 
the past is always in harmony with the present” (ep. 3, min. 1.05). The series 
prioritizes the positive spillover effects of the Silk Road, while ignoring specific 
historical factors and human involvement. The documentaries suggest that the 
Silk Road “suddenly vanished in the middle ages” (ep. 5, min. 2.04), but China’s 
BRI offers a cultural renaissance, breathing “new life into the ancient trading 
route” (ep. 5, min. 2.24). Spaces and societies between China and the West are 
for the most part ignored in the series. The space in-between is visually reima-
gined with barren desserts and memories of “nomadic tribal lands” (ep. 1, min. 
24.55). Thus, the series exemplify China’s historical statecraft; representations of 
the past are used to legitimize the BRI, and frame China as a peaceful trading 
country. This is possible due to “historical narrative ‘cherry picking’ and ‘de- 
coupling’” (van Noort 2022) and highlighting a convenient and compelling plot.
Taken together, the Silk Road series presents a “cosmetic image” (Steele 2010, 
25) of the historic Silk Road to improve the self-identity of China and legitimize 
the BRI. Aside from the presence of the Russian journalists, the series present a 
China-centric version of the Silk Road.
Present
The series brings the “spirit” of the Silk Road into the present by putting a 
human face to China’s infrastructure initiative, and linking it to the attainment of 
people’s dreams. One of the episodes explains that the “new economic belt is 
more than just an image building international project for China”, its “main goal 
is to improve the standard of living for ordinary people” (ep. 4, min. 15.26 and 
15.31). The visual imagery associates human development with economic pro-
gress (ep. 2, min. 7.01). An interview with an Urumqi entrepreneur in a bazaar – 
who embraced the opportunities generated by the BRI – reinforces this message 
(ep. 2, min. 13.24). The personal narratives of this entrepreneur and other such 
“heroes” humanize the BRI (ep. 2, min. 11.30). An on-screen interview with a 
Lanzhou business executive voices: “One Belt One Road Initiative has dramati-
cally altered my career and my life” (ep. 2, min. 22.59). With a great smile, he 
describes how construction has broadened his horizons (ep. 2, min. 23.03). Thus, 
with prosperity as a key theme, the New Silk Road is about dreaming and having 
dreams come true.
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The series communicates infrastructure projects in an aesthetically-appealing 
manner. For transportation, glossy images of the successful opening of the 
Lanzhou-Hamburg route (ep. 2, min. 5.43) demonstrate dreams about cross- 
continental rail transport coming true, and close-ups and drone footage of 
airports and railways (ep. 2, min. 8.12) in Lanzhou visually convey the narrative 
that China’s BRI is rejuvenating historic transport hubs. Lanzhou itself is con-
sidered “a living symbol of China’s developmental leap” (ep. 5, min. 14.32), 
which is gradually turning into a “futuristic city with particular Chinese aspects 
to its development” (ep. 5, min. 4.40). Living conditions in modern China are 
positively visualized using aerial shots of tall residential buildings (ep. 2, min. 
0.54): China is a continuous “construction site” (ep. 2, min. 1.17; ep. 4, min. 
14.39), and it is this unimpeded infrastructure development that makes human 
development possible.
Technological developments are visually narrated with reference to a 
Chinese quality control operations, assessing goods aimed at the Russian mar-
ket (ep. 4, min. 7.43). Here, Allabert’s guided tour of a testing facility alternates 
images of a shiny new modern office space; images of scientists/technicians in 
face masks and lab coats undertaking experiments with test tubes, computers, 
microscopes and other high-tech equipment; and robotics in motion (ep. 4, min. 
5.55). The subtitles indicate the huge number of quality control protocols that 
the business has developed. More progress is to be expected with China’s 
“openness to new technology, new quality levels and new partners” (ep. 4, 
min. 11.42). The visual narrative of the Silk Road project, then, uses aesthetically- 
appealing images of infrastructural developments to convey a journey to a 
better future. The speeded-up time-lapse footage of modern China – in indus-
trial areas – reinforces a progressive Silk Road narrative combining high-tech 
infrastructure projects with human connectivity and development (ep. 2, min. 
5.08). These images of modernity and progress are in contrast with the images 
of the durable city walls of the historic Silk Road.
China’s BRI is associated with important roles for waypoints along the trading 
route. The city of Xi’an, for example, is portrayed as playing an important role in 
the New Silk Road, by hosting the Silk Road Museum. The mobius strip statue in 
front of the museum suggests connectivity and time travel (ep. 1, min. 7.28); 
modern Xi’an remains a spectacle to the eye, hosting lively and colorful street 
scenes. Therefore, strategic narratives of the present build on those of the past 
with Silk Road nostalgia and the “charm” of China’s civilization giving meaning 
to both periods.
The role of several new duty-free towns in China is also explored. One of 
these is Horgos (also named Khorgos), which sits on the border of China and 
Kazakhstan. With the revival of the Silk Road, the city of Horgos is transformed 
into a “mecca for entrepreneurs” (episode 4, min. 18.08) and international 
buyers are welcomed (ep. 4, min. 20). Visuals progress from panoramic shots 
of underdeveloped and nondescript areas to the increased presence of adverts 
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in Russian, to internal shots of a shopping center, where there are lots of bright 
lights and Russian script (ep. 5, min. 24.39). Scenes of customers and bus tours 
from Kazakhstan reinforce the commercial value of these duty-free towns (ep. 4, 
min. 19.12). The visual imagery of these cities updates the trading dimension of 
the Silk Road for a modern age.
The Chinese city of Horgos is situated in the tumultuous province of Xinjiang. 
The documentaries frame the BRI as a positive development for the Xinjiang 
province (episode 4, min. 15.59). The visual reports of Western China imply an 
inclusive approach to culturally diverse contexts, ignoring the province’s violent 
recent history, the ways in which the ruling Party’s own discourses have exa-
cerbated ethnic tensions there, and the Uyghur internment camps they have 
subsequently constructed (Tobin 2020). The province is described as three times 
the size of France (ep. 2, min. 18.45), and hosting Chinese and Turkic peoples 
(ep. 2, min. 19.03). One of the episodes explains that the city of Urumqi, situated 
in Xinjiang, means “beautiful pasture” (ep. 3, min. 17.49). The craftsmanship of 
an Urumqi entrepreneur is visually admired (by zooming in; ep. 2, min. 20.18). In 
an interview, the well-dressed bazaar salesman explains that “[t]hings used to 
be worse, but now life is looking up” (ep. 2, min. 20.28). The Silk Road series 
obscures local contestations to Chinese developments by means of aesthetic 
power – artistic charm matched with human dreams. The series thus creates 
ambiguity and a vulnerable identity-narrative of China in the process.
While Russia is visually neglected in the strategic narratives of the past, the 
present is shaped by supportive communication of Sino-Russian relations. The 
series narrate that during the historic Silk Road, “Russia was not one of China’s 
partners,” but in the twenty-first century, everything has changed (ep. 4, min. 
13.11), and “trust between the two countries has reached a special level” (ep. 4, 
min. 15.11). This sense of trust is supported both by their joint development of 
an innovation park, and the media collaboration to which China is fully com-
mitted: “Our cooperation with Russian media has a solid foundation” (ep. 5, min. 
3.34). A logo of a uniformed panda bear and brown bear, who are holding a 
camera and pencil (ep. 1, min. 15.26), subtly suggests the friendliness under-
pinning the media collaboration. The two bears, representing the governments 
of China and Russia, are holding hands and are smiling. Visual reports of the 
“China and Russia on the Silk Road” press tour opening ceremony support the 
logo by suggesting a collaborative environment (ep. 3, min. 2.25). The on-screen 
brief interview with Andrey Denisov, Russian Ambassador to China, reinforces 
the countries’ strategic partnership (ep. 5, min. 2.41).
The development of a joint innovation park in Xi’an, considered “the Chinese 
Skolkovo” (ep. 5, min. 10.10), further exemplifies this strategic partnership and 
sense of trust. A Russian aircraft company is expected to open an office at Xi’an’s 
innovation park (ep. 4, min. 9.25). It is assumed that this innovation park will see 
“Russian and Chinese companies work side by side” and future employees are 
promised “comfortable working conditions and a good standard of living” (ep. 4, 
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min. 9.10 and 9.19). Brief aerial shots of the innovation park, including cranes, 
glass and concrete buildings, visually support the voiceover. The Silk Road series 
hints at a benign China, with comments such as “we help Russian companies” 
(ep. 4, min. 9.58). Taken together, the visual and verbal texts suggest a special 
place for Russia among the countries affiliated with China’s initiative (ep. 5, min. 
3.20), and supports China’s ambitions to become an infrastructure and stan-
dards-setting power (van Noort 2022).
The Silk Road series historicizes China’s rise through a selected history of 
regional trade, and to a lesser extent, China’s recent socialist history. China’s 
success is explained in relation to the market economy reforms in the year 1992, 
due to which the series suggests “[m]illions of dreams came true” (ep. 4, min. 
4.55). China’s “leap forward” (ep. 4, min. 4.34) is visually supported by juxtapos-
ing 30-year-old footage of China with modern-day visuals of technological and 
urban progress, illustrating that from a predominantly agricultural economy, 
“socialist China has built up a market economy from scratch” (ep. 4, min 3.59). 
The Silk Road series thus tries to reconcile China’s ancient and recent histories 
by appealing to the traditions of Chinese civilization, reform and revolution.
Future
Strategic narratives of the future are interrelated with the present. The series 
uses personal stories to explain the continuous benefits of the BRI: “Every 
granddad can tell their grandchild that they are living in the future” (ep. 2, 
min. 1.44). A Lanzhou town-planner anticipates that “industry will develop and 
people will have affluent and peaceful lives” (ep. 2, min. 23.39). Strategic 
narratives of the future are visually supported with aerial shots of rejuvenated 
Silk Road cities and construction sites. In other words, infrastructure develop-
ment will continue to shape and benefit the lives of ordinary people in the 
foreseeable future.
China’s BRI is explained as “one of the world’s largest development strate-
gies” (ep. 4, min. 12.46), in which infrastructure projects are strategized to 
achieve a better world. China’s careful planning is explained with reference to 
the ancient Chinese game, Go, images of which appear on screen. In this game, 
which is assumedly as old as the historic Silk Road (ep. 4, min. 12.54) “each move 
is carefully considered” (ep. 4, min. 12.42). So, when a Chinese economist builds 
on this analogy by predicting that China’s economy will soon rise from number 
two to number one in the world (ep. 4, min. 6.40 and 6.36), he explicitly links 
China’s strategic traditions of the past with its infrastructural plans for the future. 
China’s commitment to planning and strategy is further visually supported with 
the metaphor of traditional calligraphy: “Chinese artists say, before putting 
brush to canvas, define where the sky and earth will go” (ep. 3, min. 0.50). The 
game of Go alludes to the ancient Chinese culture and the art of calligraphy uses 
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS 17
artistic charm to reinforce the economist’s message. The narrative explains the 
BRI as a well-thought-out Chinese project that builds on the best of the past to 
guide China and its Silk Road partners into a prosperous future.
Discussion
Empirical contribution
The Silk Road documentary series produced collaboratively by CRI and RT 
provides an instructive case study into the opportunities and limits of visual 
communication of strategic narratives for domestic and international publics 
and journalist audiences. The promotional trip around which it was organized 
provided a large group of Russian and Chinese journalists – a primary audience 
for the project – with a tailored experience of this infrastructural work-in- 
progress, giving them the raw material from which to cascade a wide range of 
press outputs for their international audiences. The international multimedia 
collaboration of CRI and RT exemplifies how the strategies of “making the 
foreign serve China” and “borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean” are 
operationalized. Despite appearances, the Russian journalists serve China by 
broadcasting Chinese government-approved narratives about the BRI and 
China on Russian media channels, thereby enhancing their legitimacy.
Given that the ability to communicate strategic narratives about China, the 
BRI, and the initiative’s supposed impact on the international order more gen-
erally is contingent on their aesthetic power, it is worth noting the extent to 
which this organized tour itself worked to beautify China’s self-concept for the 
journalists taking part, by exposing them to cultural experiences (episodes 1, 3), 
historical reenactments (episode 1), ancient natural and architectural wonders 
(episode 1) and technological marvels (episode 4). Many of the recurrent themes 
in the Silk Road documentaries’ portrayal of the region derived directly from 
these curated experiences, which beautify and discipline strategic narratives of 
the past. A combination of civilizational narratives and Silk Road narratives are 
used to highlight Chinese culture and artistic charm, and to recount trade and 
connectivity during the Han and Tang Dynasties (which are perceived as the 
“golden ages” due to the unification and expansion of the Chinese empire, see 
Keay 2009). These communication practices discipline imaginations of the 
region’s history in ways acceptable to Chinese authorities, and palatable to 
international audiences. At the same time, it promotes China’s traditional cul-
ture and artistic charm and enhances national culture soft power, consistent 
with China’s soft power strategy.
In projecting visual narratives of the present, the series relates China’s infra-
structure initiative in terms of human dreams, and stresses the linkages between 
the current infrastructural project with the potential betterment of life for 
ordinary people. Thus, smiling advocates of multiculturalism and artisanal 
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products of indigenous ethnic groups were situated in the context of a market-
place (episode 2), while other people made use of newly constructed bridges, 
buildings, offices and laboratories (episodes 2, 4), or happily immersed them-
selves in sites of consumer capitalism (episode 4), all set in the wider context of 
fast-moving vibrant cityscapes (episodes 2, 5). The series’ visual projection of the 
future builds both upon the romanticized images of the past, and the techno-
logized images of the present. According to this account, the BRI will revitalize 
this old trading route (episode 5), elevate the Chinese economy to the top 
position in the world (episode 4), and through this, bring benefits to ordinary 
people (episode 2), including foreign tourists (episode 5).
The Silk Road documentary series thus translates China’s official strategic 
narratives of the BRI into a visually stimulating, aesthetically pleasing and 
engaging format. This concrete representation of the peaceful and multilateral 
nature of China’s rise (Laruelle 2018; van Noort 2022) demonstrates the poten-
tial of media productions to imbue states with the aesthetic power to portray 
their self-identity and, subsequently, policy activities, in the most attractive 
manner possible for journalists, politicians, and domestic and international 
audiences. The vulnerability of this aesthetic vision was to some extent miti-
gated by its ostensible production out of an immersive cultural program, rather 
than as something explicitly political. However, the media collaboration was 
political – sanctioned and supported at the highest levels of both the Chinese 
and Russian states within a context of wider strategic media collaborations 
between the two countries’ state-funded international broadcasters. The project 
received practical support from their respective embassies and media ministries, 
as well as the vocal backing of members of their political elites. Their subscrip-
tion to the sense of the project is not incidental.
Yet, despite the equitable partnership indicated by the supporting rhetoric, 
the production of the Silk Road series, and the strategic narratives projected 
through it clearly reflect the “asymmetric partnership” between China and 
Russia (Kaczmarski 2016). In production terms, while the setup of the series 
was collaborative, RT undertook most of the labor, whereas CRI (through its 
journalists’ contributions) shaped the tone, and solely retained the copyright. In 
projection terms, the form in which the content was delivered was clearly 
situated within a preexisting pattern of media activity established by China 
Radio International. The previous “Hello China” cycles provide the natural 
reference point. Together with the curated experience of the journalists, this 
conditioned the final output, whose feel is of a commissioned advertorial.
What is more, the strategic narratives visually presented in the Silk Road 
series are unmistakably those of the Chinese state. Russia’s vision for the EAEU 
was the harmonization of economic and humanitarian processes from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
2016), and its objective in cooperating with BRI is to leverage Chinese invest-
ment to develop the physical infrastructure necessary to facilitate such a 
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development (Timofeev, Lissovolik, and Filippova 2017, 65). Russia’s vision of 
regional development can be seen as a historically informed reorganization of 
the post-Soviet space that buffers against globalization. China’s vision, by con-
trast, is of a far more inclusive and flexible linking to the outside world that 
maximizes globalization’s benefits (Kaczmarski 2017).
Moreover, the series mirrored the visual strategic narratives in China Global 
Television Network’s (CGTN) digital media productions about the BRI because its 
content too reveled in nostalgia for a China-centric Silk Road history and framed 
China as an infrastructure and standards-setting power (van Noort 2022). Using 
similar compositions that contribute to China’s self-image and a shared mean-
ing of the BRI, the Silk Road series revealed selective representations of the past, 
artistic charm, references to ancient Chinese civilization, and political endorse-
ments, and emphasized the shared economic benefits (i.e. joint innovation park 
in Xi’an). With China claiming that it “helps” Russian businesses, it frames itself in 
this cultural co-production as a “good neighbor, good friend, and good partner”.
The strategic narratives projected in the series therefore represent not a co- 
constructed regional vision, but China’s carefully curated self-identity, partially 
reimagined and given credence through Russian eyes. While the series is 
compatible with both states’ strategic interests in the broad sense, it represents 
a ceding to China of Russia’s aesthetic power, and agency over the outwards 
projection of normative frameworks. However, the strategic interests of these 
states are clearly not always in perfect alignment with their respective interna-
tional broadcasters, or the journalists employed by them. Notwithstanding this 
asymmetrical collaboration, journalists at both broadcasters undoubtedly ben-
efitted from the first-hand experiences and inspiration of their expenses-paid 
international trip; and RT gained from the collaboration the resources (financial, 
creative and practical) to produce a documentary series that subsequently aired 
on its own online and broadcast networks.
Theoretical contribution
This paper has sought to make a theoretical contribution to the study of visual 
politics, strategic narratives, aesthetic power and Silk Road as a foreign policy 
discourse by explaining how the production process and visual content of 
documentaries are strategized in political communication (Bleiker et al. 2018; 
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013; Steele 2010). Despite the emerging 
focus on international broadcasting operations, few scholars present detailed 
studies on the strategic but diverging benefits of media partnerships, and the 
development of documentaries specifically. This case study has demonstrated 
how the visual content and production process of a collaborative media project 
can advance the strategic narratives of one political actor. It has revealed how 
China’s communication strategies of “making the foreign serve China” and 
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“borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean” are utilized to disseminate positive 
narratives of China and the BRI. Media collaborations such as these conceal the 
visual politics of documentaries, and their asymmetric benefits.
Given the curated cultural experiences of the journalists traveling along the 
Silk Road route, the media forum can be partly understood as the application of 
Chinese aesthetic power to a journalistic community that has potential to 
disseminate this aesthetic vision further over time, as well as to the political 
elite figures invested in the successful execution of the collaboration. Following 
the “cascade effects” of soft power initiatives (Entman 2003; Handley 2010), this 
media collaboration can be seen as an attempt by China to impact key influen-
cers, both journalists and civil servants, who took part in the promotional trip. It 
is of no strategic concern that the external audience for this series is likely to be 
small, since the project’s overall impact is intended to come as much from the 
production process as from the completed documentary. The media collabora-
tion encourages key influencers from Russia to cascade outputs to secondary 
audiences in the longer-term, thus producing conditions conducive for a longer- 
term positive impression. Notwithstanding the small audience, the airing of the 
documentaries is critical. According to Roselle, “Soft power assets are always on 
display. [. . .] Soft power assets can be promoted and publicized to target 
audiences for instrumental purposes – as in representational force or strategic 
narratives” (Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2014, 73).
The visualization of this media collaboration implies the ceding of narrative 
agency to Russia. Yet, this conceals the aesthetic power projected by China 
throughout the formation process, by curating the cultural experiences on 
which Russian journalists based their testimonies. The journalists’ visual, textual 
and oral appreciation of the ancient, the new, and the anticipated Silk Road 
therefore adds an affective element to what was essentially their reinterpreta-
tion of China’s pre-curated strategic narratives of the BRI. China’s continuous 
influence over the production process contained the visual reinterpretation of 
its strategic narratives. China derives further aesthetic power from the high-level 
performance of Sino-Russian cultural collaboration, which beautifies the BRI for 
the political elites engaged in the media forum, thus rendering it benign.
This aesthetic power is carried through into the projection of documentaries; 
they can beautify a policy (in this case the BRI), secure China’s self-concept, and 
reinforce its asymmetric partnership with Russia, built upon self-restraint and 
adaptation in response (Kaczmarski 2016). The extended format of documen-
taries renders them an effective format for performing rhythm in terms of 
process and visual content (both extraordinary and mundane). In this case, 
the melody of camels, cranes and human faces suggests a dynamic temporal 
and spatial disposition; the universality of these visual symbols suggests the 
wider geographical intentions of China’s infrastructure initiative. Yet, the aes-
thetic power of such documentaries remains vulnerable to the contrasting 
interpretations of alternative documentaries and other media forms.
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The selective use of history creates further opportunities and limits for visual 
reinterpretation through documentaries. The case study analysis showed how 
China systematically applies representations of the Silk Road, while smoothing 
over inconvenient aspects. For instance, China’s strategic narratives of the past 
fail to mention the ambivalent and often discriminatory relationship that the 
Chinese empire had with foreigners (Levathes 1994, 34; see also Keay 2009, 273). 
Such historical specificities complicate China’s strategic narratives of the past 
that associate connectivity with trade and prosperity. At the same time, the 
series do not elaborate on Russia’s Silk Road history despite the country’s 
connection to its Northern branches (UNESCO, n.d.). By communicating China- 
centric Silk Road narratives and concealing contentious historical specificities, 
the documentaries reimagine historical narratives acceptable to China. Also, 
China’s historical narratives that promote a memory of “peace and cooperation, 
openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2019, article 4) better justify the 
buy-in of Russia to the BRI through its discursive ambiguity. This, then, explains 
Russia’s cooperation in the production of essentially a Chinese-commissioned 
advertorial.
Conclusion
Media collaboration between state-funded international broadcasters can trou-
ble many assumptions about the operations of soft power: such collaborations 
offer divergent benefits for the states, broadcasters, and journalists involved; 
they may be designed for the long-term influence of elite groups rather than 
immediate influence on the mass public; and even the appearance of partner-
ship can mask a ceding of aesthetic power from one state to another.
The visual imagery of the RT/CRI Silk Road Series conveys Chinese, rather than 
Russian strategic narratives. China’s approach to these series is not unexpected, 
as it is consistent with its soft power strategy and resembles other media 
productions. China’s strategic narratives have been replicated throughout 
Chinese media outputs on the BRI. For example, China Global Television 
Network’s (CGTN) 2019 three-part documentary on ‘The New Silk Road’7 pre-
sents strikingly familiar visual imagery: drone footage of geographical expanses; 
planes, trains, barges and cranes; roads and bridges; shipping containers; globes 
and maps with illuminated transit routes; time-lapse footage of urban life; 
factory workers, consumers and tourists. If a picture is worth a thousand 
words, China’s visual narratives of the BRI say: The BRI is about more than 
infrastructure. China is developing the world, connecting people and making 
dreams come true. Documentaries play a key role in projecting such political 
messages.
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Notes
1. BBC World News (formerly BBC World Service Television), 1991; Euronews, 1993; France 
24, 2006; DW-TV, 1992; language expansions in 2009.
2. Russia’s RT (formerly Russia Today), 2005; Telesur (predominantly sponsored by 
Venezuela), 2005; China’s CGTN (formerly CCTV), 2000; Iran’s PressTV, 2007; Turkey’s 
TRT World, 2015; Qatari Al Jazeera English, 2006.
3. Available to view online at: https://rtd.rt.com/series/the-silk-road-series-discover-mod 
ern-China/
4. Full archive of Hello China videos available here: https://gbtimes.com/tag/Hello% 
20China%20video%20series
5. The home page for this channel can be found at: https://www.katyusha.tv/ru/about
6. Writer Nikita Rudakov, Producer Gennady Govorukhin, and Senior Producer Andrey 
Blagodyrenko all have other credits with RTD.
7. Available to view on YouTube, here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = 
cQE56UAEmDs
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